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I. a FundamenTal PrInCIPle 
oF euroPean SoCIal 
SeCurITy
The determination of applicable legislation is one 
of the fundamental principles of social security for 
migrant workers (746). The objective is to avoid any 
doubts as to which specific law governs the social 
protection of the migrant worker. In the absence of 
this principle, taking into account that it belongs 
746( ) Although this principle is not literally taken over in Article 42 of 
the EC Treaty. Also Guy Perrin in his book (La sécurité sociale, son 
histoire à travers les textes, Tome V: histoire du droit international de 
la sécurité sociale, Paris, Association pour l’étude de l’Histoire de la 
Sécurité Sociale, 1993, 361) does not mention this principle either as 
a fundamental principle of international coordination. 
to the national sovereignty of any Member State to 
determine the conditions and criteria under which 
persons may be insured (workplace, residence, 
nationality, etc.), a situation could arise where two 
or more conflicts in law would simultaneously apply 
or which appear to fall outside any relevant legisla-
tion. The objective of this principle is therefore to 
ensure in the interest of the migrant worker that 
there is complete protection, immediately avail-
able, wherever the worker is at that time (747).
The methods to determine the applicable legis-
lation may be diverse and are not always easy to 
747( ) ILO, Introduction to social security, Geneva, ILO, 1984, 154.
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apply, ranging from place of work to the place of 
residence or location of the employer, the flag 
state, etc.
Within the European Union the option was made 
to choose the place of work, the lex loci laboris, as 
the criterion for defining the applicable legisla-
tion. Legal as well as practical arguments were at 
the origin of this decision. The idea was to clearly 
link the social security rights of the migrant to the 
legal system of the country to which s/he is most 
attached in her or his daily life. The lex loci laboris 
was therefore not only in line with the initial social 
security schemes to be coordinated, but also 
reflects the idea that social security is a comple-
ment to waged work, and that social security and 
labour are often closely interrelated, for example 
for the calculation of benefits or for the adminis-
trative organisation (748). It also coincides with the 
rule of conflict applicable in the area of labour law 
(see the Convention of Rome of 1980 and Regula-
tion (EC) No 593/2008). Choosing the residence of 
the worker could also encourage the employer to 
choose on the basis of the level of contributions 
as they might differ between the states. In that 
respect, choosing the connecting factor of the lex 
loci laboris follows the general principles of the 
free movement of workers, which was — at least 
at the adoption of the coordination regulations — 
the framework of reference. Social security is also 
an aspect of public law, relating to a question 
of financial division of social security costs for 
migrant workers (749).
As a result, competition, as regards workers, takes 
place according to the terms applicable to the mar-
ket where the job is performed.
It is only when the nature of some types of employ-
ment renders the strict application of the rule 
of the workplace law impossible that alternative 
748( ) The salary of the beneficiary is often an important criterion in the 
calculation of the benefits.
749( ) See S. Van Raepenbusch, La sécurité sociale des personnes qui 
circulent a l’intérieur de la Communauté économique européenne, 
Brussels, Story-Scientia, 1991, 225.
connecting factors, such as the place of residence 
or the location of the employer, were established.
The conflict rule not only determines where the 
employee is insured, but also where the employer 
has to pay contributions. In this respect, it is irrel-
evant if the employer has no other link to this 
state than the fact that his worker is working for 
him there, even if the employer is established in 
another Member State and pays less contribu-
tions there (750).
Lex loci laboris is therefore the general rule of attach-
ment, to be applied even when no choice has been 
made (751). Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 only dero-
gates from the general rule of attachment to the 
state of employment in specific situations and on 
grounds of practicality and efficacy, which render 
attachment to the state of residence more appro-
priate and more in conformity with the interest of 
frontier workers (752).
The fundamental option for lex loci laboris has, 
however, on many occasions been questioned, at 
different moments of accession when new Member 
States, in particular based on residence, joined the 
European Union. The state of employment would 
therefore no longer be considered the most appro-
priate or suitable (753). The increasing number of 
Beveridge/Nordic model countries, as well as the 
750( ) Case C-8/75 Le Football Club d’Andlau [1975] ECR 739; the actual 
Article 91 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 points out that ‘an employer 
shall not be bound to pay increased contributions by reason of the 
fact that his place of business or the registered office or place of 
business of his undertaking is in the territory of a Member State other 
than the competent state’. In the new Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, 
this self-evident rule was abolished.
751( ) The Rebmann case (C-58/87 [1988] ECR 3467) determines that the 
taking into account of a frontier worker’s periods of full unemployment 
for the purpose of calculating pension rights falls, in the absence of a 
specific provision, under the general rule which causes the situation 
of frontier workers to be governed in principle by the law of the state 
of employment (para. 19). 
752( ) Case C-58/87 Rebmann [1988] ECR 3467, para. 15.
753( ) A. Christensen and M. Malmstedt, ‘Lex loci laboris versus lex loci 
domicilii — An inquiry into the normative foundations of European 
social security law’, European Journal of Social Security, Issue 1, 
Kluwer Law International 2000, 69; see also D. Pieters, ‘Towards a 
radical simplification of the social security coordination. Exploratory 
study on possibilities of replacement of Regulations (EEC) Nos 
1408/71 and 574/72 in order to simplify the EC co-ordination of social 
security schemes’, in P. Schoukens (ed.), Prospects of social security 
coordination, Leuven, Acco, 1997, 190.
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introduction of elements of residence and non-
contributive benefits in the traditional Bismarkian 
countries, were often seen as justifications for ques-
tioning the lex loci laboris. Although this discussion 
sometimes turns too much in the direction of a 
country-specific approach in counting the actual 
numbers of resident-based systems compared with 
the initial schemes to be coordinated at the begin-
ning of the European Union, the new framework 
of coordination (Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) 
confirms, and to a certain extent even strength-
ens, the choice for the lex loci laboris. In addition, 
in this regulation a person pursuing an activity as 
an employed or self-employed person in a Member 
State will be subject to the legislation of that Mem-
ber State (754). Only for non-active persons, the place 
of residence is applicable (755). But questions remain 
about the appropriateness of these conflict rules. 
Did the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
create the right momentum for modifying/adapting 
the conflict rules almost 50 years after the adoption 
of the coordination regulations, and was a unique 
opportunity therefore missed to adopt a new ‘bet-
ter’ (?) conflict rule?
In a process of simplification and rationalisation, the 
new Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 did bring, apart 
from the clear designation rule for non-active per-
sons, some — minor — modifications to the actual 
system, with respect to the posting provisions (756) 
and the designation rules for simultaneous per-
formance of professional activities in two or more 
Member States (757), just as the only existing excep-
754( ) Article 11, 3(a) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.
755( ) Article 11, 3(e) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.
756( ) In particular the extension from the maximum period of posting from 
one year to two years, as well as the inclusion in the new provision of 
conditions that had already been made clear in the case-law of the CJ 
(the fact that the employer, when somebody is posted abroad, needs 
to normally carry out his activities in the sending state, as well as the 
fact that, in the case of the posting of a self-employed person, it is 
required that this person pursue a similar activity in the temporary 
state of employment); see Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.
757( ) Here the most important modifications took place; in particular, the 
specific rule for international transport workers has been abolished, 
so that they now fall under the general rules, just as it is now required 
that the person concerned fulfils a substantial part of his activities 
in the state of residence, before this state becomes applicable; see 
Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
tion (until now, under Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71) 
to the general principle of the single applicable leg-
islation has been abolished (758). 
II. a need For a revISIon oF 
The ConFlICT ruleS?
But is a purely cosmetic adaptation of the conflict 
rules sufficient or is there a need to further funda-
mentally change the actual rules and why should 
we do that?
Which reasons could justify a further reflection on 
new rules of applicable legislation? In our opinion, 
three factors could play a role (759).
In the first place, there is the clear changing migra-
tion pattern. The migrant worker of 50 years ago is 
no longer the migrant worker of today. One of the 
most important changes has been regarding the 
nature of migration itself, with new patterns of work, 
including increasingly flexible labour markers. The 
regulation was set up at a time when workers had 
a full-time, permanent employment relationship, 
and the migrant worker was someone — usually a 
male — who moved to his country of work (with 
or without his family) and at the end of his career 
returned to his country of origin. People in general 
migrated for better working opportunities and con-
ditions, including higher wages. For example, a typ-
ical migrant working in the coal mines moved for a 
long period to another state, often only returning to 
his country of origin when reaching retirement age. 
This type of migrant worker in particular focused on 
758( ) Article 13(3) of Regulation (EC) No 833/2004; the actual Annex VII of 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. Compared with Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71, Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 abolishes some separate rules 
for special categories of people. Under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
there is no special rule anymore for international transport workers; 
there is no longer a choice for persons employed by diplomatic 
missions or consular posts; no special rule for civil servants working in 
two countries; no rule for undertakings straddling a common frontier; 
no special rule for civil servants insured in a special scheme; and no 
rule for persons not belonging to the crew and working on a vessel 
within the territorial waters or the port. 
759( ) For a general overview of general trends and challenges for the 
actual regulations, see Y. Jorens and J. Hajdú, European Report 2008 
— Training and reporting on European social security, Project DG 
EMPL/E/3 — VC/2007/0188, Brussels, 125 p. 
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fully integrating the social security systems of the 
state of his new workplace. When migrating at a later 
age, the biggest problems these persons were con-
fronted with were related to the possible export of 
retirement benefits. Today there is greater diversity, 
with a range of different types of migrant workers 
including, for example, cross-border frontier work-
ers, temporary migrant workers and pan-European 
management personnel, contributing to a growing 
pan-European labour market. Further globalisation 
and the creation of a European internal market has 
led to a growing number of employees being sent 
out by their employer to perform temporary activi-
ties in another Member State. People commute 
weekly or daily to other states and workplaces. The 
career planning of a worker today often involves 
several consecutive international assignments (for 
the short or longer term), often within a network 
of companies, throughout different Member States. 
It is not so much that the permanent move has 
become the most important trend, but rather that 
the intra- and interorganisational move has.
In particular, migrant workers that are often work-
ing for short periods abroad are more in favour of 
further belonging to their social security system of 
origin and less of being integrated in their country 
of short employment.
It has often been argued that these new forms of 
mobility are challenging the principles and actual 
rules on applicable legislation. Might it indeed not 
be said that the high flexibility combined with the 
short assignments to different Member States, lead-
ing to a constant switch of the lex loci laboris, makes 
this general conflict rule inappropriate? Does it not 
only complicate to a large extent the social security 
situation of these migrant workers, but also pre-
vents further migration? (760) What is to be said of the 
managers within a multinational group who often 
transfer their workplace from one business loca-
tion to another and visit, throughout their career, 
760( ) A. Numhauser-Henning, ‘Freedom of movement and transfer of 
social security rights’, in R. Blanpain (ed.), Collective bargaining, 
discrimination, social security and European integration, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2003, 185–186.
several branches of this group of companies? The 
fact that these persons move within a network of 
closely related companies, where the worker some-
times even concludes a local employment contract 
with a daughter company, while maintaining his 
main, but frozen labour contract with the mother 
company, often complicates the ‘mapping’, as it 
becomes unclear who the worker’s employer actu-
ally is. Live-performance workers can, for example, 
take up employment with an EU live-performance 
organisation in another EU country; for example, 
they can be posted as an employee with an EU live-
performance company when this company is per-
forming in other EU countries, or take up a service 
contract as a self-employed person in another EU 
country (761). The specific problems of mobility that 
these groups of people encounter quite often result 
in the appeal to enact particular conflict rules that 
would be better adapted to the specific characteris-
tics and situations of these categories (762).
In the second place, freedom of movement — the 
fundamental background principle for the coordi-
nation regulations — has evolved and has moved 
from an economic perspective to a wider idea of 
human rights. The relationship between the free 
movement of workers as an instrument and the eco-
nomic concern of the European Union has changed 
into a growing union of citizens. The migrant work-
er is, in the first place, not an economic person, 
but a human being looking to improve his living 
and working conditions. In the same way, the free 
movement of workers has evolved towards a union 
of ‘European citizens’. The economic dimension has 
moved to the background, in order to establish a 
legal order consistent with the idea of social justice 
and people’s expectations of European integration, 
as it can be understood from the general objectives 
761( ) See, for example, R. Pollachek, ‘Study on impediments to mobility 
in the EU-live-performance sector and on possible solutions’, study 
performed for Pearle, Mobile.Home Project, Helsinki, 2007, 14.
762( ) R. Pollachek, ‘Study on impediments to mobility in the EU-live-
performance sector and on possible solutions’, study performed for 
Pearle, Mobile.Home Project, Helsinki, 2007, and ERA Green Paper, 
‘Realising a single labour market for researchers’, RTD DG and Council 
conclusions of 30 September 2008, No 13571/08.
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of the Treaties (763). ‘The creation of citizenship of the 
Union, with the corollary of freedom of movement 
for citizens throughout the territory of the Member 
States, represents a considerable qualitative step 
forward in that it separates that freedom from its 
functional or instrumental elements (the link with 
an economic activity or attainment of the internal 
market) and raises it to the level of a genuinely 
independent right inherent in the political status of 
the citizens of the Union’ (764).
This creation of European Union citizenship, also 
as interpreted by the Court of Justice (CJ) (765), has 
established a new set of rights for economically 
inactive people, until then almost ignored under 
European Union law (766), and has given them the 
status of active claimants of social welfare provi-
sion, even when they have not been or are not 
exercising an economic activity (767). As the CJ 
applies the provisions of European citizenship also 
in cases that are covered by the European regula-
tions, it has made clear that the coordination Regu-
lation (EEC) No 1408/71 (and in future Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004) is not the only means for people 
to obtain social security benefits and rights. A new 
notion of European solidarity has been created (768).
763( ) See A. Touffait, ‘La jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des 
Communautés Européennes en matiere de sécurité sociale des 
travailleurs Européens qui se déplacent’, Mélanges offerts a P.H. 
Teitgen, Paris, 1984, 525.
764( ) Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, para. 82 of the opinion 
delivered in Morgan (Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan 
[2007] ECR, 9161. 
765( ) Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala [1998] ECR 2691; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk 
[2001] ECR 6193; Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR 7091; Case 
C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR 2703; Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR 
7573; Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR 2703; Case C-209/03 Bidar 
[2005] ECR 2119; Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen [2006] ECR I- 10451; Case 
C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR 6947.
766( ) The rights of economically non-active people were elaborated in 
the three residence directives (90/364/EEC on the rights of residents; 
90/365/EEC on the right of residence for employees and self-employed 
persons who have ceased their occupational activity; and 93/96/EEC 
on the right of residence for students). These three directives have 
now been replaced by the general residence directive (2004/38/EC). 
767( ) E. Spaventa, Free movement of persons in the European Union. 
Barriers to movement in their constitutional context, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2007, 114–115.
768( ) See also M. Ross, ‘Promoting solidarity: From public services to a 
European model of competition?’, Common Market Law Review 2007, 
1065; M. Coucheir (ed.), M. Sakslin (ed.), S. Giubboni, D. Martinsen 
and H. Verschueren, Think Tank Report 2008: The relationship and 
interaction between the coordination regulations and Directive 
2004/38/EC — Training and reporting on European social security, 
Project DG EMPL/E/3 — VC/2007/0188, Brussels, 2008, 37ff.
This brings us to the third (and very closely relat-
ed to the concept of European citizenship) reason 
why it is necessary to take a closer look at the rules 
on applicable legislation. At the same time as the 
first cases of European citizenship appeared in 
the social field (769), people, i.e. also workers, were 
relying directly on other EU Treaty provisions, per-
haps hardly believing that they could influence 
their concrete social security rights. With its cases 
in the field of healthcare (770), the CJ attacked the 
national conditions of refusal to reimburse medi-
cal treatment abroad under the internal market 
rules, in particular the free movement of goods and 
services, thereby opening to Community nation-
als a second way of receiving cross-border medical 
care in addition to Article 22 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 1408/71. As a result of this case-law, two dif-
ferent procedures, one having no primacy over 
the other, govern the healthcare costs incurred in 
another Member State (771). These examples made 
clear that people could obtain social rights directly 
on the basis of the principles of free movement.
An important development taking place in this 
respect is the direct reliance on the general prin-
ciples of free movement of persons (Article 39) 
by European workers, in order to combat possi-
ble limitations to their fundamental rights, limita-
tions that not only are the result of national rules, 
but also sometimes follow from the application 
of the EU regulations themselves. The traditional 
non-exportability of certain benefits under the 
regulation, such as special non-contributory ben-
efits or unemployment benefits, could be increas-
ingly questioned under the direct applicability of 
the general principles of free movement of the EU 
Treaty. Recent CJ case-law, but also developments at 
the national level, have made clear that even inclu-
sion in Annex IIa of the regulation, exempting the 
769( ) Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala [1998] ECR 2691.
770( ) Starting with Cases C-120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I-1831, and C-158/96 
Kohll [1998] ECR 1931.
771( ) Y. Jorens, M. Coucheir and F. Van Overmeiren, ‘Access to healthcare 
in an internal market: impact for statutory and complementary 
systems’, basic report, Brussel, AIM, 2005, Bulletin Luxembourgeois 
des questions sociales, 18, 2005, 13.
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national authorities from the obligation to export 
these benefits, is not necessarily the end of the 
story. CJ cases, such as De Cuyper (772), Petersen (773) or 
Hendrix (774), have shown that the non-exportability 
of certain benefits has to be looked at alongside 
the right of freedom of movement under Article 39 
EC Treaty or European citizenship under Article 18 
EC Treaty. Under these circumstances, conditions 
of residence can only be put forward if their object 
would be justified and proportionate to the objec-
tive pursued. This might end up with other results. 
In the Hendrix case for example, although the CJ 
considered a benefit for young disabled people, 
listed in Annex IIa of the regulation, as non-export-
able, it questioned its compatibility with the prin-
ciples of freedom of movement under Article 39 
EC Treaty. It was up to the national court to answer 
and, after weighing the national legislation in the 
light of these principles, the national court declared 
the non-export clause not to be applicable. Exam-
ples such as these confirm that the regulations are 
no longer the only route towards the coordination 
of social security for migrant workers. This is also a 
growing tendency not only in the field of the free 
movement of workers but also in the field of the 
free movement of services. In the Rüffert case (775) 
on minimum wage, dealing with Directive 96/71/
EC, the CJ directly investigated the requirement of 
payment of a salary — a domain clearly regulated 
by this directive — within the perspective of the 
free movement of services.
Relying directly on the EU Treaty has as a conse-
quence that every rule will now be judged against 
the general test of free movement, i.e. is the appli-
cation of the rule concerned an impediment, for 
which no objective justification can be found, and 
is the principle of proportionality respected? While 
finding an objective justification might still be easy, 
it becomes much more complicated to pass the 
proportionality test. The non-exportability of some 
772( ) Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR 6947.
773( ) Case C-228/07 Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989.
774( ) Case C-287/05 Hendrix [2007] ECR 6909.
775( ) Case C-346/06, Rüffert [2008] ECR 1989.
of the benefits is a clear example. In the De Cuyper 
case (776) the CJ confirms that the residence clause, 
which is imposed on an unemployed person, who 
is exempt from the requirement of providing that 
he is available for work as a condition for retain-
ing his entitlement to unemployment benefits, is 
a restriction, which was, however, justified by the 
need to monitor the employment and family situa-
tion of an unemployed person. Looking at this justi-
fication, it is obvious that the CJ was very receptive 
to the arguments used by the Belgian Member 
State, arguments which were in actual fact hardly 
convincing at all. It is clear that similar restriction 
rules might have more difficulties in the future to 
pass the free movement test. This is clearly con-
firmed in the Petersen case (777), regarding the non-
exportability of an advance granted to unemployed 
persons who applied for the grant of invalidity 
benefits and which was considered by the CJ as an 
unemployment benefit. Here the CJ clearly states 
that, unless it is objectively justified and propor-
tionate to the aim pursued, such non-exportability 
must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it 
is intrinsically liable to affect migrant workers more 
than national workers and if there is a consequent 
risk that it will place the former at a disadvantage. 
Although the CJ states that the EU regulations do 
not preclude the legislation of a Member State from 
making entitlement to an unemployment benefit 
conditional on residence, at least in normal situa-
tions, this was not true with respect to the particu-
lar situation of Mr Petersen. The CJ argues that the 
Austrian government had not sought to explain the 
objective, which is to be achieved by the residence 
requirement, but even so — although it is possible 
that the risk of seriously undermining the financial 
balance of a social security system may in particu-
lar (author’s own italics) constitute an overriding 
reason in the general interest. The existence of 
such a risk would be difficult to establish, since, by 
granting the benefit to applicants who reside in the 
776( ) Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR 6947. 
777( ) Case C-228/07 Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989.
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national territory, the competent authorities have 
in fact demonstrated their capacity to bear the eco-
nomic burden of that benefit. As it is also intended 
to be paid to applicants for an invalidity pension for 
a limited period of time, the residence requirement 
also seems to be disproportionate.
The national rule, as well as the rule of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71, is crushed under direct applica-
tion of the EU Treaty provisions, where Member 
States are now confronted with a task they often 
forget, i.e. the concrete justification in the particular 
case assessed in the light of the proportionality test 
— however, not in a very abstract way, but applied 
to the particular situation of the case and of the 
person concerned. Also in the Baumbast case (778) 
the CJ applies the principle of proportionality to the 
facts of the case (779); the CJ chose to scrutinise the 
rules in concreto, taking into account the facts of 
the particular case. Even in cases in which the legis-
lation is in principle compatible with the demands 
of Community law, applied in the concrete situa-
tion, it might be contrary to it (780). Member States 
will be required to pay much more attention to 
the concrete justification in cases and cannot limit 
themselves to general statements. For the individ-
ual looking for protection under Community law, 
it might be easier to attack the conformity of the 
national rules with EC law.
This in concreto evaluation has further led to an 
increased review of the conformity of secondary 
European legislation with the general principles of 
EU law (781). The CJ does not hesitate to investigate 
778( ) Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR 7091.
779( ) See justification 92. In a recent case, the Förster case (Case C-158/07 
Förster, judgment of 18 November 2008, not yet published) dealing 
with a maintenance grant, the CJ looks at the situation from an 
abstract rather than a concrete point of view. It remains unclear if the 
CJ herewith wants to deviate from its previously established case-
law according to which the concrete individual factual situation is 
taken into account (see also the contribution of E. Spaventa in this 
publication). 
780( ) E. Spaventa, Free movement of persons in the European Union. 
Barriers to movement in their constitutional context, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2007, 155.
781( ) M. Coucheir (ed.), M. Sakslin (ed.), S. Giubboni, D. Martinsen and H. 
Verschueren, Think Tank Report 2008: The relationship and interaction 
between the coordination regulations and Directive 2004/38/EC 
— Training and reporting on European social security, Project DG 
EMPL/E/3 — VC/2007/0188, Brussels, 2008, 36–37.
the conformity of national rules, even if they follow 
secondary European legislation, directly under the 
EC Treaty rules. This amounts, as Dougan points out, 
to ‘a judicial review of that very Community legisla-
tion, not of the privileged sort one would expect as 
regards questions of competence in the exercise 
of Community’s own legislative powers, but rather 
of the frontline sort one witnesses all the time as 
regards national provisions restricting free move-
ment under the primary Treaty provisions’ (782). The 
review of proportionality performed by the CJ could 
be seen to pose a challenge to the European legis-
lature’s autonomy, competencies and powers (783). 
National rules in conformity with the coordination 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 (and the future Regu-
lation (EC) No 883/2004), as well as the social secu-
rity coordination regulation itself, will increasingly 
be confronted with the test of conformity with the 
fundamental principles of EU law (784). The ultimate 
framework is no longer the regulations, but the 
conformity with free movement.
The abovementioned reasons make it clear that, 
although we all may be to a lesser or larger extent 
satisfied with the actual rules, it could happen that 
the actual, but also future, coordination rules will 
be under further attack regarding their conformity 
with the general principles of EU law as elaborated 
by the provisions on EU citizenship, free movement 
of workers, free movement of services and even 
free movement of goods. 
782( ) M. Dougan, ‘The constitutional dimension to the case-law on Union 
citizenship’, European Law Review 2006, 620–621.
783( ) See also S. Besson and A. Utzinger, ‘Introduction: Future challenges 
of European citizenship — Facing a wide-open Pandora’s Box’, 
European Law Journal 2007, 575; and M. Coucheir (ed.), M. Sakslin 
(ed.), S. Giubboni, D. Martinsen and H. Verschueren, Think Tank Report 
2008: The relationship and interaction between the coordination 
regulations and Directive 2004/38/EC — Training and reporting on 
European social security, Project DG EMPL/E/3 — VC/2007/0188, 
Brussels, 2008, 37.
784( ) See justification 57 of the conclusions of Advocate General Kokott 
in Case C-287/05 Hendrix [2007] ECR 6909 ‘Thus, a restriction on 
the fundamental freedoms must be justified by overriding reasons 
in the general interest even where that restriction derives from a 
Community regulation or a national measure which is in accordance 
with secondary law. Admittedly, Community and national legislatures 
enjoy a discretion when adopting measures in the general interest 
which affect the fundamental freedoms. The CJ retains the right, 
however, to examine whether legislatures have exceeded the scope 
of that discretion and infringed thereby the fundamental freedoms.’
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III. are The aCTual ConFlICT 
ruleS eC reSISTanT?
a. New rules for new migration patterns?
Are the regulations adapted to this new framework? 
Is today not the right moment, while we celebrate 
50 years of regulations, to reflect on the possible 
revision of a system of conflict rules that has existed 
for 50 years?
Quite often the debate revolves around new or 
adapted rules that should take into account new 
patterns of migration.
Within the general objective of the new regulation 
to simplify and modernise the actual provisions, 
some special rules — for special groups — that 
were complicating the coordination system were 
abolished. In this respect, the adaptation and 
enacting of special provisions for ‘new’ forms of 
mobility would contradict the rationalisation proc-
ess started under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The 
new inclusion of specific rules for so-called ‘new’ 
categories could lead to an increasing number of 
demands from other groups, increasing the frag-
mentation and uniform application of the conflict 
rules. Generally, it can be acknowledged that link-
ing rules of conflict with categories of employees is 
not a convincing approach. It appears, in line with 
the Administrative Commission on Social Security 
for Migrant Workers (CASSTM) (785), that very few 
situations seem to require specific treatment.
Artists, airplane crews, etc. already moved about in 
the past. Certainly not to the same extent, but advo-
cating that special provisions should be adopted to 
take into account of these forms of mobility would 
somehow presume that the European legislator 
originally ignored, to a lesser or larger extent, these 
groups of people. Some forms of mobility are there-
fore not really new, but have just become more 
785( ) See document of 4 October 2007, 278/07 REV.
frequent. The use of interim agencies and the appli-
cation of the conflict rules in these circumstances 
has been recognised for decades. Already in 1970 
the CJ had to deal with the application of the post-
ing provisions with respect to interim agencies (786). 
Some other forms, like air crews, were regarded as 
transport workers.
These examples show that some of the issues relat-
ed to new forms of mobility result, not so much 
from the inappropriateness of the existing rules, 
but rather from the difficulties inherent in under-
standing the concepts and their implementation. 
One could therefore argue that Regulation (EEC) 
No 1408/71 and Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 are 
in fact reasonably well adjusted to new forms of 
mobility. What is required is agreement over the 
interpretation of the concepts and their effec-
tive implementation, rather than any wholesale 
change to the principles or operative concepts of 
the regulations (787).
The expert group working on the free movement 
for researchers, for example, wants to promote the 
use of Article 17 agreements (Article 16 of Regula-
tion (EC) No 883/2004) as a method for avoiding 
impediments to the free movement of these per-
sons, in order to better take into account their par-
ticular situation (788). The performance sector would 
also like to see the procedures to receive E101 forms 
made easier (789).
Better use of the actual provisions, however, implies 
the need for further clarification. The lack of clarity 
and the different interpretation of the rules regard-
ing the provisions on applicable legislation will not 
only result in the controversial use, and perhaps 
even incorrect application, of the actual provisions, 
786( ) Case C-35/70 Manpower [1970] ECR 1263.
787( ) See Y. Jorens (ed.), J-P. Lhernould (ed.), J-C. Fillon, S. Roberts and B. 
Spiegel, Think Tank Report 2008 — Towards a new framework for 
applicable legislation. New forms of mobility, coordination principles 
and rules of conflict — Training and reporting on European social 
security, Project DG EMPL/E/3 — VC/2007/0188, Brussels, 2008, 7.
788( ) See Council conclusions of 30 September 2008, DOC13571/08.
789( ) See, for example, R. Pollachek, ‘Study on impediments to mobility 
in the EU-live-performance sector and on possible solutions’, study 
performed for Pearle, Mobile.Home Project, Helsinki, 2007, 34.
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but might also become the object of complaints 
before the CJ. A typical example of inconsistent use 
is the application of Article 17 of Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71 (Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) 
that allows Member States to conclude agreements 
in the interest of the migrant worker that deviate 
from the conflict rules. Every Member State applies 
its own rules which often differ from one another, 
not only between the states concerned, but some-
times even within the same state. One day it might 
even be difficult to explain to the CJ why workers in 
identical circumstances fall under different legisla-
tions due to different views among Member States 
about the application of this article. Could this be 
challenged on the grounds of discrimination? (790) 
It is of course true that one of the fundamental dif-
ficulties in this respect is that the regulation is a 
coordination instrument and does not harmonise 
social security, thereby leaving the responsibil-
ity for implementation to the Member States. It is 
therefore not the priority role of the European legis-
lator to define the concept used, but a guiding role 
could be welcomed.
Of course, it cannot be ignored that, at least with 
respect to the growing flexible labour market, an 
increasing number of specific forms of mobility 
related to new forms of labour contracts are appear-
ing: people working with fixed-term contracts; peo-
ple working temporarily for employers via interim 
agencies; people, for a short time, at the disposal 
of heavily integrated companies; people working 
at home (teleworking); people moving constantly 
within a multinational group or simultaneously 
working at different plants in different Member 
States, sometimes with contracts concluded with 
several branches, etc. But is it always a problem 
of adopting new rules? Are the problems not also 
related to the difficult ways of understanding and 
implementing the basic concepts of the actual con-
flict rules? Working in an international, intra-organ-
isational network of enterprises is a typical example 
790( ) See Y. Jorens and J. Hajdú, European Report 2008 — Training and 
reporting on European social security, Project DG EMPL/E/3 — 
VC/2007/0188, Brussels, 8.
of that. The related problem is that the ownership of 
equipment and employment of personnel increas-
ingly rests with different undertakings, staff being 
typically employed by ‘global’ employment compa-
nies. How do we define the employer? Does it make 
sense to look at this network of companies as a 
group of separate enterprises, each with their judi-
cial personality, or should we look at it as one big 
entity, where the ‘mother’ company is the leading 
employer? What is the impact if a contract is con-
cluded with a ‘daughter’ company? Is the employer 
the one with whom a labour contract is conclud-
ed, or is it rather the mother company who holds 
authority over the different branches or daughter 
companies? Let us refer to a recent case before 
the French Court de Cassation (791). An employee 
working for the mother company Oréal ended her 
contract when she was mutated to the daughter 
company in China. She concluded a labour contract 
with this daughter company but was fired when 
she became pregnant. According to the Court de 
Cassation, there was an unjustified dismissal as no 
reclassification took place. Notwithstanding the 
fact that a contractual relation no longer existed 
between the mother company and the employee, 
the court considered that the mother company was 
still responsible as it took the initiative to put the 
employee at the disposal of the daughter company. 
Is the main company therefore the real employ-
er? Would it not be possible in such cases for the 
employee, during the whole period of employ-
ment, to be subject to the place where the main 
employer is situated? But imagine also the case of 
an employee transferred to another daughter com-
pany with whom he concludes a labour contract 
while the initial contract with the mother company 
is frozen and lies dormant. It is foreseen that the 
person concerned will eventually be reintegrated 
into the mother company or will obtain a guaran-
tee that, at the end of the period of employment at 
the daughter company, he will get a new job at the 
mother company or a similar function somewhere 
791( ) See Lhernould, J-P., ‘Obligations de la société-mère suite au 
licenciement du salarié mis à disposition d’une filiale étrangère, Cass. 
Soc. 13 novembre 2008, pourvoi No 07-41700’, Dr Soc. 2009, 69.
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within the group. Can the idea of reintegration be 
seen as an element for determining the place with 
the closest connection and as such for determining 
the most appropriate conflict rule? Would it not be 
better to look at such a situation from a more life-
oriented global approach?
But a concrete answer to the challenges mentioned 
above requires more than a merely cosmetic adap-
tation of the conflict rules. The question is whether 
the actual rules would pass the test of the general 
principles of free movement? It should also be tak-
en into account that, if new rules were elaborated, 
they should be in conformity with these principles. 
Would it not therefore be better if we reflected on 
a possible new framework, and investigated the 
fundamental principles and philosophy behind the 
actual system, i.e. the neutral character, the com-
pulsory character and the exclusive and strong 
effect of the conflict rules? (792)
b. Towards a new fundamental 
approach?
1. The objectives of the regulations
A preliminary question before possibly changing 
the actual conflict rules is to find out for whom 
these coordination regulations are written. Whom 
should they protect?
The coordination regulations are an instru-
ment adopted to guarantee the free movement 
of workers. As the preamble to Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 clearly states: ‘the rules for coor-
dination of national social security systems fall 
within the framework of free movement of per-
sons and should contribute towards improving 
792( ) This was exactly the task that the Think Tank on new forms of mobility 
and applicable legislation is undertaking within the Tress project. 
This report is therefore also indebted to the reflections and ideas put 
forward by this Think Tank, to whom the author of this article belongs 
(see Y. Jorens (ed.), J-P. Lhernould (ed.), J-C. Fillon, S. Roberts and B. 
Spiegel, Think Tank Report 2008 — Towards a new framework for 
applicable legislation. New forms of mobility, coordination principles 
and rules of conflict — Training and reporting on European social 
security, Project DG EMPL/E/3 — VC/2007/0188, Brussels, 2008). The 
activities of the Think Tank will continue in the year 2009.
their standard of living and conditions of employ-
ment’ (793). The objective of the new regulations 
was to guarantee that the right to free movement 
of persons can be exercised effectively (794).
The coordination regulations therefore fit perfect-
ly with the general objectives of the EU Treaty as 
enshrined in Article 2, to promote a high level of 
social protection and to raise the standard of living. 
From the beginning, the CJ declared that the regu-
lations in the field of social security have as their 
basis, their framework and their limitations Arti-
cles 48 to 51 (39–42) of the Treaty, which are aimed 
at securing freedom of movement for workers (795). 
The coordination regulations therefore have to 
be interpreted in the light of the free movement 
of workers. The interests of the workers obtain a 
central place in the coordination framework. The 
regulation, however, only installs a ‘system of coor-
dination, not the harmonisation, of the legislation 
of the Member States’. As a result, Article 51 (now 42) 
leaves in differences between the Member States’ 
social security systems and, consequently, in the 
rights of persons working in the Member States. It 
follows that substantive and procedural differences 
between the social security systems of individual 
Member States, and hence in the rights of persons 
working in the Member States, are unaffected by 
Article 51 (now 42) of the Treaty (796). As a matter 
of fact, it is not obvious whether one is insured at 
all by the appointed legislation. Indeed, it is up to 
the legislator of each Member State to lay down 
the conditions creating the right or the obligation 
to become affiliated to a social security scheme or 
to a particular branch of such a scheme or to be 
entitled to a benefit (797). The person concerned will 
therefore only be insured if he or she fulfils the 
national conditions. Just as social security is only 
793( ) Point 1 Preamble.
794( ) Point 45 Preamble. 
795( ) Case C-100/63 Van der Veen [1964] ECR 565; see also Case C-242/83 
Patteri [1984] ECR 3171.
796( ) Case C-41/94 Pinna [1986] ECR 1.
797( ) Case C-29/88 Schmitt [1989] ECR 581; Case C-2/89 Kits van Heijningen 
[1990] ECR 755, para. 19; Case C-275/96 Kuusijärvi [1998] ECR 3419, 
para. 29; and Case C-227/03 Van Pommeren-Bourgondiën [2005] ECR, 
para. 33.
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coordinated within the EC, the EC Treaty offers no 
guarantee to a worker that extending his activities 
into more than one Member State or transferring 
them to another Member State will be neutral as 
regards social security. It follows that, in princi-
ple, any disadvantage, compared with a worker 
who pursues all his activities in one Member State, 
resulting from the extension or transfer of his activ-
ities into one or more other Member States and 
from his being subject to additional social security 
legislation, is not contrary to Articles 48 and 52 
(now 39 and 43) of the EC Treaty if that legislation 
does not place that worker at a disadvantage com-
pared with those who pursue all their activities in 
the Member State where it applies (798).
With respect to the conflict rules, the CJ has con-
stantly explained the objectives of these rules from 
the perspective of the worker: ‘the aim of the provi-
sions of Title II of Regulations Nos 3/58 and 1408/71, 
which determine the legislation applicable to work-
ers moving within the Community, is to ensure that 
the persons concerned shall be subject to the social 
security scheme of only one Member State, in order 
to prevent more than one national legislative sys-
tem from being applicable and to avoid the compli-
cations which may result from that situation’ (799).
This predominant role of the worker in the objec-
tives of the regulations does not, however, exclude 
other parties, traditionally involved in the social 
security field, from playing a role. This is particularly 
clear with respect to the conflict rules. We already 
mentioned, for example, that the CJ declared that 
it is not only the worker who is subject to that 
state, but also the employer, and the fact that the 
employer should pay less contributions in his state 
of establishment is of no relevance (800).
798( ) For example, Cases C-393/99 and C-399/99 Hervillier [2002] ECR 
I-2829; see also C-493/04 Piatkowski [2006] ECR I-2369. The same as 
a matter of fact also applies in the field of, for example, fiscal law (see 
Case C-365/02 Lindfors [2004] ECR 7183).
799( ) See, for example, Case C-60/85 Luijten [1986] ECR 2365; Case C-2/89 
Kits van Heijningen [1990] ECR 755; Case C-196/90 De Paep [1991] 
ECR 4815, para. 18; Case C-202/97 Fitzwilliam [2000] ECR 883, para. 
20; Case C-275/96 Kuusijärvi [1998] ECR 3419, para. 28; Case C-101/83 
Brusse [1984] ECR 2223, para. 14
800( ) Case C-8/75 Le Football Club d’Andlau [1975] ECR 739. 
Where an employee is insured therefore also influ-
ences the situation of the employer. In particular 
with respect to the posting rules, which are also 
related to the free movement of services and as 
such to the interest of the employer, the CJ declares 
that Article 13(1)(a) of Regulation No 3 aims at 
overcoming the obstacles likely to impede the 
freedom of movement of workers and at encour-
aging economic interpenetration whilst avoiding 
administrative complications for workers, under-
takings and social security organisations (801). So, 
apart from the employees, the conflict rules are 
also installed in the interest of the employer and 
the social security institutions.
2. The balance of interests
A possible review of the framework on applica-
ble legislation should therefore not lose sight of 
the role and involvement of these three parties 
(employee, employer and administration) and 
should find the right balance between the inter-
ests of these three stakeholders. This is the idea 
that the Think Tank of Tress on new forms of mobil-
ity elaborated: the balance of interests should 
determine the applicable legalisation.
The interests of these three parties are, however, 
different and sometimes contradictory (802).
For the employee what counts will be: that there 
is no change in the insurance career to build up 
long-term benefits (especially pensions); to get the 
highest possible benefits (e.g. no loss of benefits 
from the home country, especially, for example, 
long-term care, family benefits); to safeguard the 
necessary flexibility so that the employer cannot 
choose another employee who is easier to handle 
801( ) See Case C-35/70 Manpower [1970] ECR 1263, para. 10; later confirmed 
in, for example, Case C-202/97 Fitzwilliam [2000] ECR 883, para. 28; 
and Case C-404/98 Plum [2000] ECR 9379, para. 19.
802( ) See Y. Jorens (ed.), J-P. Lhernould (ed.), J-C. Fillon, S. Roberts and 
B. Spiegel, Think Tank Report 2008 — Towards a new framework 
for applicable legislation. New forms of mobility, coordination 
principles and rules of conflict — Training and reporting on 




and cannot get rid of the non-flexible employee 
who insists on a social security situation which is 
contrary to the interests of the employer; to pay the 
lowest contributions (as long as they lead to ben-
efits); to have the legislation of the same Member 
State applicable in the fields of social security, taxa-
tion and labour law — as this would guarantee that 
all his different rights would be linked to one and 
the same place, i.e. his central place of interest.
For the employer, however, other interests will be 
important: to be confronted with only the home 
social security scheme because only this one is well 
known; to have the legislation of the same Mem-
ber State applicable in the fields of social security, 
taxation and labour law as this would facilitate 
administration; to make full use of the competitive 
advantages of the free market (to use these pos-
sibilities to have the cheapest labour force) — at 
least not to have to pay more contributions than 
local competitors and to be flexible enough so 
that (the high-ranking) employees are willing to 
move (if the negative impact on the employees is 
too big, this could hinder any cross-border activity 
of the employer).
Last but not least there are the social security insti-
tutions. For them it will be important to have only 
contribution-payers resident in the relevant Mem-
ber State (as any cross-border execution of con-
tribution debts is cumbersome and takes a long 
time). Taking into account situations in other Mem-
ber States is always more complicated than taking 
into account only the well-known situations inside 
the state (e.g. income in one state could be differ-
ent from the notion of ‘income’ in the other state) 
and it avoids disputes with the institutions of other 
Member States.
We are therefore confronted with three different, 
often contradictory, sets of interests.
If one wants to take these three interests into 
account, the question remains whether they now 
all play the same role, or is one to be given priority? 
Should the interest of the employee not take prior-
ity, taking into account the clear free movement of 
workers’ framework of the regulations? This may be 
the case, but the CJ is not always very clear on this 
issue. We already mentioned that the principles of 
free movement of services can also play a role. In 
recent years in particular we have noticed a grow-
ing interest in, and number of cases dealing with, 
the conflict between the free movement of services 
and the social protection of workers. In these cases, 
the CJ takes the economic interest of the employer 
as a starting point (803) and makes the social rights 
dependent on the exercise of the economic free 
movement of services. Avoiding social dumping 
for example, clearly at the heart of social protec-
tion, can only be combated within the framework 
of the posting Directive 96/71/EC, based on the free 
movement of services.
The role of the third stakeholder, i.e. the social secu-
rity institutions, might, however, be of lesser impor-
tance. The CJ made clear that Article 48 of the Treaty 
(now 39) precludes a Member State from levying, 
on a worker who has transferred his residence from 
one Member State to another in the course of a year 
in order to take up employment there, higher social 
security contributions than those which would be 
payable, in similar circumstances, by a worker who 
has continued to reside throughout the year in that 
Member State without the first worker also being 
entitled to additional social benefits. The CJ clear-
ly states that considerations of an administrative 
nature or difficulties of a technical nature, linked 
to particular methods of collection tax and social 
security contributions, cannot justify derogation 
by a Member State from the rules of Community 
law (804). This case-law was also repeated under the 
framework of the free movement of services (805).
According to this case-law, administrative simplifica-
tion as an interest of the social security institutions 
803( ) See Case 341/05 Laval [2007] ECR 11767; Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] 
ECR I-10779.
804( ) Case C-18/95 Terhoeve [1999] ECR 345, para. 45.
805( ) Case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755.
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cannot be invoked. One can argue that the inter-
ests of these institutions therefore clearly are of less 
importance than the interests of the workers or the 
employers. But is it possible to find a justification 
with respect to the employer in case of an obstacle 
to the free movement of workers?
As the worker is at the heart of the regulation, might 
his interests not always be predominant?
But are the interests of the worker today also pro-
tected by these regulations and what is meant 
by these interests? This brings us back to the fun-
damental principles behind the regulations: the 
neutral character of the applicable legislation; the 
compulsory character; and the principle of the sin-
gle applicable legislation, also translated into the 
concepts of exclusive and strong effect.
3. The fundamental principles behind the 
conflict rules
(a) The neutral character
We have already pointed out that conflict rules 
are generally set up in the interest of the migrant 
workers to ensure that they are protected. ‘In the 
interest of the migrant worker’ should, however, 
narrowly be understood as implying that, due to 
the different national criteria used for insurance, 
migrant workers should not have to either fall 
between two stools, nor have to pay twice for pro-
tection. It does not mean that the migrant worker 
has a right to the highest benefits. What is impor-
tant is that administrative complications should 
be avoided, rather than that the highest benefits 
or perhaps the lowest contributions should be 
paid (806). Article 17 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 
(Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004), which 
allows the competent authorities of the Member 
States to provide for exceptions to the conflict 
rules in the interest of certain categories of per-
sons or of certain persons, confirms this reasoning. 
806( ) Case C-60/85 Luijten [1986] ECR 2365; Case C-202/97 Fitzwilliam 
[2000] ECR 883; Case C-404/98 Plum [2000] ECR 9379.
The ‘interest’ rather relates to the determination of 
the applicable legislation than to the application 
of the legislation itself, i.e. the amount of benefits, 
the concrete rights and obligations, the eventual 
application that a particular legislation would bring 
about (807). The appointed legislation on the basis 
of Article 17 replaces the traditional conflict rules. 
As such, just as the fundamental objectives behind 
the conflict rules have, Article 17 has as its basic 
intention the avoidance of administrative compli-
cations. Also the recent CJ Bosmann case (808) shows 
that, if someone wants to obtain a higher benefit 
or even a benefit, he depends on the national legis-
lation of the Member State concerned. The conflict 
rules of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 therefore do 
not pay particular attention to the contents of the 
applicable law and the best possible protection for 
the employee.
It might therefore be perfectly possible that the 
employed or self-employed person would obtain 
higher social security benefits in case another leg-
islation were applied. But the coordination regula-
tions do not pay attention to this kind of interest 
of the employee. If administrative complications 
are avoided by appointing a particular legislation 
A, even in cases where application of another leg-
islation B would be more beneficial for the worker, 
preference seems, according to this reasoning, to 
be given to legislation A.
The application of a principle of favouritism, known 
under the rules of international private law and 
labour law, is missing in the field of social security. 
The posting Directive 96/71/EC states that the appli-
cation of the legislation of the country of temporary 
employment shall not prevent application of terms 
and conditions of employment which are more 
favourable to workers (809). The same principle can 
also be found back in the Rome Convention and the 
807( ) Y. Jorens, Wegwijs in het Europees sociale zekerheidsrecht, Brugge, 
Die Keure, 1992, 78; see also the point of view of the European 
Commission in Case C-101/83 Brusse [1984] ECR 2223.
808( ) Case C-352/06 Bosmann [2008] ECR I-3827.
809( ) Article 3(7) of posting Directive 96/71/EC.
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Rome I Regulation (810) in the field of international 
private law. Through this principle of favouritism the 
contents of the law are of importance and the best 
system with the biggest protection has priority.
This is certainly not the case under social security law.
But is this priority for avoiding administrative compli-
cations always in conformity with the principle of free 
movement of workers? Is the fact that an employee 
is not guaranteed the highest possible benefits as a 
result of a choice of conflict rules made under the 
regulation an impediment to free movement?
Or is the Community legislator perhaps immune to 
such arguments, as it is in his own power to decide 
which rules are in conformity with the EU Treaty? It 
is true that the CJ pointed out that the Council has 
a wide discretion regarding the choice of the most 
appropriate measures for obtaining the objective 
of Article 51 of the Treaty (now 42) and therefore 
had the liberty to depart in some respects at least 
from the mechanisms currently provided for in 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 (811). This wide discre-
tion should guarantee that the actual conflict rules 
are consistent with the principle of proportionality, 
and therefore judicial review of the exercise of such 
power must be limited to examining whether such 
exercise is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of 
powers, or whether the institution concerned has 
manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (812).
But taking into account the fundamental objectives 
of the coordination regulations to achieve the free 
movement of persons, is it in conformity with the 
principle of proportionality that more and higher 
benefits are sacrificed on the altar of less adminis-
trative complications? It is doubtful.
But even if one only looks at the argument of 
lesser administrative complications, do the actual 
810( ) Article 6 of the Rome Convention and Article 8 of the Rome I 
Regulation. 
811( ) Case C-443/93 Vougioukas [1995] ECR 4033, para. 35.
812( ) Case C-242/99 Vogler [2000] ECR 9083.
conflict rules pass this test? Let us take the exam-
ple of frequently mobile workers who have to 
change legislation every time they take up a new 
job. By not ensuring continuity in the applicable 
legislation, this would lead to a further impedi-
ment (813). We cannot ignore the fact that such a 
situation would increase administrative complica-
tions, which would be against the objectives of the 
conflict rules. In particular, if the European legisla-
tor deliberately chose a different conflict rule for 
another category of people, might it then not be 
argued by this group of frequently mobile workers 
that a similar application of that conflict rule would 
generally lead to less administrative impediments 
and would therefore be more in conformity with 
the free movement of persons?
But might it also be possible to go one step further, 
looking at the abovementioned case-law of the CJ, 
where the CJ clearly states that conformity with 
the free movement of persons has to be looked 
at, not in an abstract way, but rather from the par-
ticular situation of the worker? Could this lead to 
a more personal investigation of the adequacy of 
the conflict rule? The lex loci laboris has been cho-
sen because it clearly fits into the perspective of the 
market integration function, allowing the worker to 
be connected to the country he is most attached to. 
It might be perfectly possible that, in a more con-
crete situation, the worker argues and proves that 
he is more attached to another country. Could it 
not be argued that in such situations an alternative 
connecting factor or conflict rule should be used as 
it better serves the worker’s interests?
(b) The compulsory character of the conflict rules
Contrary to the rules on labour law and interna-
tional private law, social security regulations do 
not foresee the possibility of free choice for deter-
mining which social security legislation would 
813( ) See Y. Jorens (ed.), J-P. Lhernould (ed.), J-C. Fillon, S. Roberts and B. 
Spiegel, Think Tank Report 2008 — Towards a new framework for 
applicable legislation. New forms of mobility, coordination principles 
and rules of conflict — Training and reporting on European social 
security, Project DG EMPL/E/3 — VC/2007/0188, Brussels, 2008, 23.
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apply (814). Social security belongs to the public field 
and is of public order and therefore parties may not 
deviate from these general principles. This cannot, 
however, exclude the fact that, at least indirectly, 
parties can influence the choice of the applicable 
legislation through the factual situations of a case, 
such as the place of residence, the location of the 
employer, the workplace, etc. (815).
The rules of conflict therefore have a compulsory 
character. This is also in line with the national social 
security schemes, according to which the principle 
of solidarity requires that the person concerned 
has to be subject to the applicable legislation. It fol-
lows from the provisions of the regulation that the 
application of national legislation is determined by 
reference to criteria drawn from the rules of Com-
munity law. Although it is for the legislature of each 
Member State to lay down the conditions creating 
the right or the obligation to become affiliated to 
a social security scheme or to a particular branch 
under such a scheme, it must be emphasised that 
this does not mean that the Member States are 
entitled to determine the extent to which their 
own legislation or that of another Member State is 
applicable (816). The application of the provisions of 
the regulations therefore depend on the objective 
conditions and circumstances in which the migrant 
worker concerned is situated and the last one has 
814( ) One exception is the free choice foreseen for diplomatic missions 
and consulars in Article 16 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. This right 
of option was further kept for the auxiliary staff of the European 
Communities in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (Article 15). See also 
Case C-60/93 Aldewereld [1994] ECR 2991, concerning the situation 
of a person who resides in the Member State and, in the employment 
of an undertaking established in another Member State, works 
exclusively outside the European Union. The option to leave the 
choice to the person concerned to decide under which legislation he 
or she would fall, taking into account that no particular conflict rule 
was foreseen for this situation under the regulation, was rejected by 
the CJ as an option was only explicitly foreseen for diplomatic missions 
and the person concerned was not in a situation comparable to that
815( ) Under the actual Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 it is well-known that 
this choice through indirect factual elements does happen in practice, 
in particular in the situation where activities are performed in two 
Member States, one of them being the place of residence. By starting 
to work at home, even for a rather short period a week, people might 
become subject to the legislation of the state of residence, instead of 
the state of employment. Under the new Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, 
this ‘intentionally arranging’ to fall under the legislation of the place 
of residence would become less probable as it is now requested that 
substantial activities be performed in the state of residence.
816( ) Case C-276/81 Kuijpers [1982] ECR 3027, para. 14; Case C-110/79 
Coonan v Insurance Officer [1980] ECR 1445.
no option (817). The provisions of Title II constitute a 
complete set of conflict rules, the effect of which is 
to divest the legislator of each Member State of the 
power to determine the ambit and the conditions 
for the application of its national legislation. The 
Member States are therefore not entitled to deter-
mine the extent to which their own legislation or 
that of another Member State is applicable, since 
they are obliged to comply with the provisions of 
the Community law in force (818). The conflict rules 
are compulsorily applicable and it is only when 
choice has explicitly been foreseen that an option 
can be used (819). In the Miethe case on unemploy-
ment benefits, the CJ clearly determines that Arti-
cle 71(1)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 must 
be interpreted as meaning that a wholly unem-
ployed frontier worker who comes within the scope 
of that provision may claim benefits only from the 
Member State in which he resides even though he 
fulfils the conditions for entitlement to benefits 
laid down by the legislation of the Member State in 
which he was last employed.
The applicable legislation is therefore derived 
objectively from the conflict rules of the regula-
tion, taking into account the factors connecting 
the particular situation with the legislation of the 
Member State.
Traditionally, free choice is considered to be exclud-
ed as it is often believed that the employee, as the 
weaker party, would not be in a position to resist 
the pressure from the employer who would pre-
sumably have a preference for the country with the 
lowest contributions. But is this correct? Also today, 
the conflict rules are only concerned with avoiding 
administrative complications and do not exclude 
the possibility that perhaps the country with the 
lowest contributions, which — although they are 
not immediately interrelated — would also lead to 
the lowest benefits for the worker concerned, would 
be chosen.
817( ) See, for example, also Case C-12/67 Guissart [1967] ECR 536.
818( ) Case C-302/84 Ten Holder [1986] ECR 1821, para. 21.
819( ) See, for example, also Case C-1/85 Miethe [1986] ECR 1837, para. 12, 
Yves Jorens
183
The option of free choice is known as a funda-
mental principle for the determination of the 
applicable labour law in the field of international 
private law (820). However, also here this funda-
mental principle of free choice is to a large extent 
undermined by measures that should protect the 
employee. In the first place, the fact that parties 
have chosen a particular law would not, where 
all other elements relevant to the situation at the 
time of the choice are connected with one coun-
try only, prejudice the application of the rules of 
the law of this country. Secondly, the choice of 
the law made by the parties cannot deprive the 
employee of the protection offered to him or her 
by the mandatory rules of the law, which would 
be applicable in the absence of choice, on the 
basis of objective criteria (821). The application of a 
principle of protection and a principle of favour-
itism for the employee therefore implies that the 
general principle of free choice is very limited. In 
case free choice were given in the field of social 
security law, one could, for example, imagine 
establishing a conflict rule as a guarantee accord-
ing to which ‘free’ choice could not deprive the 
application of the social security protection of 
the country to which the employee concerned 
is most attached. On the other hand, this would 
not solve the problem as the next task would be 
to decide the country to which the employee is 
most attached. Would that be the country with 
the highest benefits? Or in the case of, for exam-
ple, a worker, who works in Member State A for an 
employer based in Member State B, where s/he is 
also living, it could be argued that it is perhaps 
country B to which s/he is most attached (822).
In general, however, allowing a free choice in the 
field of social security is not recommendable, not 
820( ) Article 3 of the Rome Convention and Article 3 of the Rome I 
Regulation
821( ) See Article 6 of the Rome Convention, as well as Article 8 of Regulation 
(EC) No 593/2008, the Rome I Regulation.
822( ) See Y. Jorens (ed.), J-P. Lhernould (ed.), J-C. Fillon, S. Roberts and B. 
Spiegel, Think Tank Report 2008 — Towards a new framework for 
applicable legislation. New forms of mobility, coordination principles 
and rules of conflict — Training and reporting on European social 
security, Project DG EMPL/E/3 — VC/2007/0188, Brussels, 2008, 25.
only because of the high risk of the employer choos-
ing the country with the lowest contributions, but 
also because it would contradict the compulsory, 
objective application of social security legislation 
and could as such also undermine the general 
financial solidarity of a social security system, lead-
ing to abuse.
One way or another, the application of an Arti-
cle 17 agreement (Article 16 of Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004) could be seen as a greater or lesser 
possibility of choosing between certain systems, 
although the choice here is more offered to the 
administrations.
(c) The principle of exclusivity and the strong 
effect of the conflict rules
The other side of the single applicable legislation 
is the exclusive effect of the conflict rules. The fun-
damental question is to know whether the conflict 
rules are in a position to exclude, in every situation, 
the application of another legislation than that 
designated by the regulation provisions without 
being in conflict with, and contrary to, Articles 39 
and 42 of the Treaty. This debate is not new. And 
it seems that the CJ ‘commutes’ between different 
points of view.
Whereas in the beginning the CJ decided that the 
regulations did not prohibit the application of the 
legislation of the Member State other than the 
one designated by the conflict rules, except to the 
extent that it requires the worker to contribute 
in the financing of the social security institution, 
which is unable to provide him with additional 
advantages (823), in later cases the CJ declared that 
‘The provisions of Title II constitute a complete sys-
tem of conflict rules the effect of which is to divest 
the legislature of each Member State of the power 
to determine the ambit and the conditions for the 
application of its national legislation so far as the 
persons who are subject thereto and the territory 
823( ) Case C-92/63 Nonnenmacher [1964] ECR 585.
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within which the provisions of national law take 
effect are concerned’; the Member States are (not) 
entitled to determine the extent to which their own 
legislation or that of another Member State is appli-
cable since they are ‘under an obligation to comply 
with the provisions of Community law in force’ (824). 
It is important to see that the CJ continues in this 
case by declaring that ‘That rule is not at variance 
with the Court’s decisions (see, in particular, the Pet-
roni judgment) to the effect that the application of 
Regulation 1408/71 cannot entail the loss of rights 
acquired exclusively under national legislation. 
That principle applies not to the rules for determin-
ing the legislation applicable, but to the rules of 
Community law on the overlapping of benefits pro-
vided for by different national legislative systems. 
It cannot therefore have the effect, contrary to 
Article 13(1) of Regulation 1408/71, of causing a 
person to be insured over the same period under 
the legislation of more than one Member State, 
regardless of the obligations to contribute or of 
any other costs which may result therefrom for that 
person’ (825). The simultaneous application of two 
national legislations would therefore not be pos-
sible. Also the Commission had declared in that 
case that the principle of inviolability of national 
acquired rights (the famous ‘Petroni principle’) (826) 
can only apply to the substantive rules of the coor-
dination regime and not to the conflict rules.
This seems to include that a worker could, as a 
result of the conflict rules, lose a higher level of 
benefits provided in another Member State. As 
such this is not really surprising as we have noticed 
that for the CJ the interest of the worker is deter-
mined by avoiding and limiting administrative 
complications, rather than by guaranteeing a high 
level of benefits.
The simultaneous application of, on the one hand, 
the national social security system on its own and 
824( ) Case C-302/84 Ten Holder [1986] ECR 1821, para. 21.
825( ) Case C-302/84 Ten Holder [1986] ECR 1821, para. 22.
826( ) Case C-24/75 Petroni [1975] ECR 1149, paras 21–22. The regulation may 
not lead to the result that national acquired rights would be reduced. 
the national social security system in combination 
with European social security law was not possi-
ble in that respect. On the other hand, in particu-
lar with respect to family benefits, the CJ already 
declared that the aim of Article 51 (42) would not be 
achieved if workers were to lose their social security 
advantages, guaranteed to them by the legislation 
of a single Member State, as the regulations allow 
different schemes to exist, creating different claims 
on different institutions against which the claimant 
possesses direct rights by virtue either of national 
law alone, or of national law supplemented, where 
necessary by Community law, in particular to the 
lifting of conditions of residents (827).
This discussion has gained a new momentum with, 
as mentioned before, the Bosmann case. Although 
the CJ firstly confirms the exclusivity character 
(under Article 13(2)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71, a person employed in the territory of one 
Member State is to be subject to the legislation of 
that state even if he resides in the territory of anoth-
er Member State; the effect of determining that a 
given Member State’s legislation is the legislation 
applicable to a worker pursuant to that provision 
is that only the legislation of that Member State 
is applicable to him), it goes further to determine 
that application of this article does not preclude a 
migrant worker, who is subject to the social secu-
rity scheme of the Member State of employment, 
from receiving, pursuant to the national legislation 
of the Member State of residence, child benefit in 
the latter state.
It could be said that the Bosmann case only extends 
this well-known principle of a cumulative applica-
tion under family benefits, taking into account that 
the particularity here is that the competent state, 
contrary to the case-law on accumulation of ben-
efits, did not provide for any family benefit. The 
fundamental question is whether the national leg-
islator might refuse the application of its national 
law or that he is obliged to apply it. It seems difficult 




to imagine that he may refuse it. The only argument 
which one could use is that it would be contrary to 
the regulation that the national law also applies. 
German authorities may introduce into their 
domestic law a provision stating that ‘family ben-
efits are granted to all persons resident on the Ger-
man territory, with the exclusion of persons who 
are subject to another EU legislation according to 
[the] coordination rules of [the] Regulation’. How-
ever, such a provision would probably be seen as a 
typical indirect discrimination based on nationality. 
The option created by the CJ would therefore turn 
into an obligation (828).
Can Bosmann be limited to situations where, if no 
family benefits are to be paid under the law of the 
competent state, migrant workers can now hope 
to get these benefits from the non-competent 
state? The statement of the CJ — ‘the provisions of 
Regulation No 1408/71 must be interpreted in the 
light of Article 42 EC Treaty which aims to facilitate 
freedom of movement for workers and entails, in 
particular, that migrant workers must not lose their 
right to social security benefits or have the amount 
of those benefits reduced because they have exer-
cised the right to freedom of movement conferred 
on them by the EC Treaty’ (para. 29) — does not 
seem to limit the reasoning of the CJ to family ben-
efits (829). The broad reasoning of the CJ justifies, in 
our opinion, the notion that the application of the 
country of residence is not only limited to family 
benefits, but can also be extended to all other ben-
efits. The person working in a Member State and 
residing in another might therefore also be enti-
tled, for example, to healthcare coverage in their 
place of residence as the legislation of the work-
place does not provide healthcare insurance.
The CJ seems to apply here the Petroni princi-
ple to the conflict rules. The framework of the 
828( ) See Y. Jorens (ed.), J-P. Lhernould (ed.), J-C. Fillon, S. Roberts and B. 
Spiegel, Think Tank Report 2008 — Towards a new framework for 
applicable legislation. New forms of mobility, coordination principles 
and rules of conflict — Training and reporting on European social 
security, Project DG EMPL/E/3 — VC/2007/0188, Brussels, 2008, 26.
829( ) Case C-205/05 Nemec [2006] ECR 10745.
coordination regulations is the free movement of 
workers and any impediment to that principle is 
forbidden. The application of the regulation, lead-
ing to a situation where the person concerned 
would be deprived of rights and benefits foreseen 
under national law — national legislation which 
would apply to the person concerned if he had not 
relied on the principles of the regulation — would 
be in contradiction of this fundamental objective. 
National entitlements must therefore always be 
taken into account. The principle that someone 
cannot be deprived of national acquired rights 
obliges the Member State that is not appointed by 
these conflict rules, but to which the person con-
cerned is subject, to pay him or her the rights and 
benefits to which he or she is entitled. A compari-
son between the benefits obtained on the basis 
of the legislation appointed by the conflict rules 
and the benefits based on national law should be 
undertaken, eventually leading to the obligation to 
pay a differential amount by the (non-competent) 
state. This certainly does not imply that the conflict 
rules will thereby become meaningless.
This idea is in line with the general case-law of the 
CJ in the framework of the free movement of work-
ers and services. Also in healthcare, the CJ already 
mentions in the Vanbraekel case that the tariffs of 
reimbursement to be paid as a result of the free 
movement of services may not lead to lower tariffs 
than those based on national law (830).
The consequences of cases like Bosmann and 
Nemec point out that the level of benefits may 
have to be taken into account and strengthen as 
such the interest of the workers. A principle of 
favouritism, as known under international labour 
law, could as such also have found its way into 
social security law. This applies to all branches 
of social security. It might shed new light on the 
actual philosophy of the conflict rules and encour-
age one to look at them again directly from the 
perspective of the EU Treaty. 
830( ) Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I-5363. 
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Iv. ConCluSIonS
Fifty years after the first EU coordination regula-
tions appeared, new developments in migration 
patterns, as well as the growing direct reliance on, 
and applicability of, the fundamental principles 
of EU law, have led to a situation where a new set 
of conflict rules could be envisaged. These rules 
should not just be cosmetic and should look at 
the fundamental principles behind these rules, 
such as the principle of neutrality, the compulso-
ry character and the one single legislation appli-
cable. Some of these principles could be adapted 
in the interest of the worker and should be in 
conformity with the free movement of workers. 
The right momentum now exists to assess the 
actual conflict rules against a test of the balance 
of interests.
